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1. Why no mutual recognition in taxation? 
There is a stark contrast between the high official praise paid to the principle of 
mutual recognition as “the cornerstone of the Single Market” (European Commission 
1999:2) and the low satisfaction with the principle’s actual operation on the ground. 
Many studies have observed that mutual recognition contributes only modestly to the 
removal of regulatory barriers in the Single Market and investigate why that is (see 
e.g. Nicolaidis 1993; Pelkmans 2003; Schmidt 2003; Schmidt 2004). The focus of this 
study is different. It asks why mutual recognition is not used at all for the removal of 
tax barriers. A comparison between the regulation and taxation of goods is used to 
identify possible answers. Why is mutual recognition applied to product regulations 
but not to VAT? 
 
The paper is structured into seven parts. The first part looks at product regulations and 
product taxation as trade barriers. The purpose of mutual recognition is to remove 
trade barriers. If it is not applied in taxation it may simply be because taxes make no 
trade barriers. As even a cursory analysis shows, this is not the case. Taxes have the 
potential to restrict trade, and mutual recognition has the potential to remove these 
restrictions. 
 
The second part turns to mutual recognition’s pre-history in regulation and taxation. 
Maybe it is not used for the removal of tax barriers because nobody ever suggested 
that it should be. The historical record reveals, however, that this is not the case. 
Already in the 1960s, long before anybody seriously advocated a general move 
towards mutual recognition in regulation, the Commission declared, and the Council 
agreed in principle that a switch from national treatment (destination principle) to 
mutual recognition (origin principle) was required in taxation (Genschel 2002). If   2
anything, the idea of mutual recognition enjoyed a head start in taxation. It just did 
not catch on.  
 
The third part turns to legal obstacles. As is well known, the European Court of 
Justice played a large role in establishing the principle of mutual recognition in 
regulation (just seeAlter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994). A brief review of the legal 
literature shows why the Court could not possibly repeat this deed in taxation. Tax 
barriers fall under a separate set of treaty articles, which do not offer a handle to the 
Court for imposing mutual recognition on the member states. The ‘negative 
integration’ road to mutual recognition is thus blocked. But, of course, ‘positive 
integration’ remains an option.
1 The member states meeting in the Council of 
ministers can introduce mutual recognition in taxation by way of a directive. Given 
the unanimity requirement in taxation, the threshold for agreement is high. But it is by 
no means insurmountable. The member states have already unanimously agreed to the 
harmonization of the VAT system, the VAT base and the range of VAT rates. Why 
not also on mutual recognition in VAT?  
 
The fourth part examines the probably most obvious obstacle to political agreement: 
fear of tax competition. Mutual recognition is an “important trigger of regulatory 
competition” (Radelli 2004:3). It may also trigger tax competition. Indeed, the 
analysis reveals some reasons to believe that competitive constraints would be 
stronger in taxation than in regulation. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that high VAT 
countries have always insisted that a move towards mutual recognition in VAT (i.e. 
the origin-principle) should be preceded by a close harmonisation of (effective) VAT 
rates.  
 
This leads to the fifth part and another potential obstacle to political agreement: tax 
diversity. It has often been noted that a harmonization of effective VAT rates is 
difficult given the large differences between VAT levels in EU member states (just 
see Genser 2003). A brief inspection shows, however, that this hurdle is not as high as 
it used to be. National VAT levels and rates are much more similar today in a 
Community of 25 than back in the 1970s in a Community of nine. Is it just a matter of 
                                                 
1 On positive and negative integration see Scharpf, F. W. (1999). Governing in Europe. Effective and 
Democratic? Oxford, Oxford University Press..   3
time until the process of de facto convergence erodes all remaining obstacles to de 
jure harmonization? 
 
The sixth part shows that tax competition and diversity are not the only political 
problems on the way to mutual recognition in taxation. There is also the issue tax 
administration. Mutual recognition ends the operational self-sufficiency of national 
tax administrators. Regulatory outcomes no longer depend on the vigilance of national 
regulators alone but also on the vigilance of foreign regulators (Nicolaidis 1993:497). 
Also, VAT revenues would no longer depend on the efforts of national tax officials 
alone but also on the cooperation of foreign officials. What used to be a purely 
national levy would in effect be turned into a collective tax. “Individual responsibility 
will be replaced by a collective responsibility” (European Commission 1996:21)  
 
The seventh part concludes.  
 
2. Trade barriers 
Taxes and regulations affect economic decisions – taxes because they are costly to 
pay, regulations because they are costly to conform with. This obviously includes the 
ability to affect decisions concerning cross-border trade. Taxes and regulations may 
bias economic decisions towards domestic activities because they impose extra-costs 
on cross-border trade. This makes them relevant from a market integration 
perspective. Market integration aims at the removal of trade barriers. The goal is to 
reduce differences in the tax and regulatory treatment of domestic and cross-border 
trade. In the fully integrated market, no such difference remains. Borders lose their 
economic significance. This is, of course, is the promised land of market integration 
in the EU, a Single Market “without internal frontiers” (article 14). 
 
Trade barriers come in two basic forms, discriminatory and non-discriminatory. 
Discriminatory barriers hinder cross-border trade directly by imposing extra burdens 
on imports. Tariffs and quotas are the most obvious examples of discriminatory 
barriers. However, internal taxes and regulations can also serve to discriminate 
against foreign goods. Non-discriminatory barriers, by contrast, hinder cross-border 
trade indirectly. They refer to taxes and regulations which apply to domestic and   4
foreign goods alike, but which nevertheless put foreign goods at a competitive 
disadvantage. If, for example, domestic product regulations differ fundamentally from 
foreign regulations, this may make it more difficult for foreign producers to comply 
with them. Foreign competitors are not discriminated against, but they are at a 
disadvantage. 
 
The EU’s original approach to market integration focused on the removal of 
discriminatory trade barriers. The Treaty of Rome set a timetable for the elimination 
of tariffs and quotas between the member states until 1970 (?) (Customs Union). It 
also banned discriminatory internal taxes and regulations. Article 90 (ex 95) of the 
Treaty states:  
No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other 
Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed 
directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.  
Article 28 (ex 30) provides that: 
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect 
shall be prohibited between the Member States. 
In short, the Treaty obliged the member states to grant imports ‘national treatment’ in 
taxation and regulation. 
 
While the removal of tariffs and quotas progressed rapidly during the 1960s, the 
implementation of national treatment proved to be more difficult. The problem in 
taxation was that five of the six member states operated turnover taxes of the cascade 
type. These taxes applied to every sale at nearly every stage of production or 
distribution with no allowance for tax already paid at earlier stages. This made the tax 
cumulative and capricious. The effective tax burden varied widely, even for products 
sold at the same price and taxed at the same nominal rate (Cnossen and Shoup 
1987:61). Even the most well intended government was unable to equalize tax 
burdens across imports and domestic goods because the tax burden of a cascade tax 
was basically an unknown. This offered less well intended governments room for 
protectionist abuse and manipulation. To remedy the situation, the Commission 
proposed a collective switch to non-cascading tax systems in 1962. The Council 
obliged by adopting the VAT system in 1967. The VAT avoids the cumulation of the 
tax burden by allowing tax payers a credit for VAT paid on inputs at earlier stages of   5
production. This ensures that the effective tax burden always equals the nominal VAT 
rate, i.e. the tax burden is known exactly under VAT. This made it technically 
possible to impose equivalent tax burdens on imports and domestic goods, and, hence, 
to implement national treatment in taxation (Genschel 2002:70-75).  
 
The problem in regulation was lack of information. The quantity and scope of national 
regulations expanded rapidly during the 1960s. The Commission sent out 
questionnaires in 1963 to survey the extent of discriminatory regulation. In 1969, the 
Council passed a catch-all (?) directive banning regulations imposing any additional 
cost or restriction on imports (Egan 2001:67-69,91). In general, however, the issue of 
regulatory discrimination was perceived as less pressing than the issue of tax 
discrimination during the 1960s. If governments want to deter foreign competition, it 
is more straight forward for them to impose additional levies on imports than to 
impose additional rules and regulations. Therefore, a preoccupation with taxation was 
an almost natural corollary to the EU’s original focus on removing discriminatory 
barriers. 
 
As the removal of discriminatory barriers advanced, the focus started to shift towards 
non-discriminatory barriers. It became obvious that market integration was hindered 
not only by brute protectionism but also by the member states freedom to impose any 
non-discriminatory tax or regulation they liked. In regulation the paramount problem 
was disparity. Each member state had its own set of technical product specifications. 
This forced producers to make more or less different products for each national 
market they wanted to enter in the Community. The extra-costs involved deterred 
market entry and kept market integration at a sub-optimally low. Production runs 
remained lower than they could have been had producers been able to market similar 
products across the entire Community. Potential economies of scale were wasted, to 
the detriment of the international competitiveness of European companies (see e.g. 
Servan-Schreiber 1968).   
 
In taxation, by contrast, disparity was not a problem. While each member state 
charged – and continues to charge – VAT at different rates (see table 1 and figure 1 
below), these differences did not affect the structure of production: Producers did not 
have to make a different product just because the VAT rate in a foreign market was a   6
few percentage points higher or lower than at home. The problem was rather that 
cross-border trade had to pass through so-called border tax adjustments. These 
adjustments were necessary in order to make sure that foreign goods carried exactly 
the same VAT burden as domestic goods. For this purpose, exports received a refund 
on VAT paid to the exporting country (country of origin) and imports were assessed 
for the VAT of the importing country (country of destination). These procedures 
imposed extra-compliance costs on international trade. While it is difficult to measure 
these costs exactly, estimates suggest that they are considerable even today (Verwaal 
and Cnossen 2002). In the eyes of the Commission, however, border tax adjustments 
also had a detrimental “psychological” (White Paper ???) effect on cross-border trade 
because they usually took place at custom posts: truckers had to stop at the border, 
have their goods checked and fill in tax forms. This, it was argued, made nonsense of 
Customs Union: “Customs borders are eliminated but tax borders remain.” (Groeben 
1962:10) 
 
In short, … 
3.  Historical legacies  
How could mutual recognition contribute to the removal of non-discriminatory tax 
and regulatory barriers in the Internal Market? The Commission was rather sceptical 
about mutual recognition’s potential to solve the problem of regulatory disparity. The 
Community’s first commissioner for competition remarked on this issue:  
At first, the key word of ‘mutual recognition of controls’ seemed to guide a 
way out [from regulatory fragmentation]. … If each member state accepted 
that a product  approved by the authorities of another member state is also fit 
for consumption by its own citizens, the problem of trade impediments and 
economies of scale would be solved. …[Unfortunately, however, this solution 
is up against] almost insurmountable difficulties. … There is the legal 
argument that the mutual recognition of controls implies the creation of new 
institutional mechanisms and, therefore, is not covered by the harmonisation 
provisions of the Treaty. Also, some member states have already signalled 
their unwillingness to accept the loss of sovereignty implied by giving foreign 
controls, i.e. acts of foreign sovereignty, domestic effect, and this even if the   7
foreign controls are based on material and procedural regulations which are 
identical to domestic regulation. (Groeben 1967:137) 
 
The misgivings about mutual recognition did not only reflect doubts about its 
feasibility and effectiveness but also the availability of a better alternative: 
harmonization. Harmonization was perceived as a more effective solution to the 
removal of regulatory barriers because it aimed straight at the root of the problem of 
regulatory diversity. It also appeared to be more politically feasible because it left the 
member states in control of regulatory policy. In case of doubt, a government could 
always veto the adoption of a particular regulation in the Council of Ministers, and, 
thereby prevent its application on the domestic market. Harmonization, therefore, 
became the standard approach to regulatory integration. In 1968, the Commission 
presented a ‘General Programme for the removal of technical obstacles to trade’ 
containing long lists of regulations to be harmonized. Only when large parts of this 
programme where stalled in the Council during the 1970s, did the Commission start to 
look more favourably again at mutual recognition (Egan 2001).  
 
Harmonization did not offer a solution to the problem of tax borders. Even if all 
member states applied identical VAT rates and VAT base definitions, international 
trade would still have to pass through border tax adjustments. The need for border tax 
adjustments did not arise from cross-national differences in taxation but from the fact 
that the right to tax international trade rested with the importing country (country of 
destination) rather than the exporting country (country of origin). The only solution to 
the problem of border tax adjustments was, therefore, to move from a destination-
based to an origin-based taxation of international trade, i.e. from national treatment 
(the country of destination taxes international trade) to mutual recognition (the 
country of origin taxes international trade). The German government proposed this 
solution already during the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome because in its mind 
border tax adjustments were incompatible with the spirit of a true Common Market 
(Genschel 2002:58). The proposal fell through during the Treaty negotiations but was 
re-launchedby the Commission in the early 1960s – this time with more success. 
While the member states refused to switch to origin-based taxation right away, they at 
least formally endorsed “the aim of abolishing the imposition of tax on importation 
and the remission of tax on exportation”, and instructed the Commission to prepare   8
plans for the implementation of this aim (Europäische Gemeinschaft 1967:article 4). 
Mutual recognition in taxation was thus established as an official policy goal of the 
Community.  
 
In short, mutual recognition enjoyed a head start in taxation. However, it was in 
regulation that it finally prevailed. Why?  
4. Legal  regimes 
The story of mutual recognition’s rise to prominence has been told many times and 
need not be told again (just see Nicolaidis 1993:ch.4; Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 
1994; Egan 2001:ch.5; Schmidt 2004:ch.2.2.2). Suffice it to say that the European 
Court of Justice played  a major role in it. By reading the logic of mutual recognition 
into the text of the Treaty, it prepared the legal ground for mutual recognition’s final 
political triumph. Two landmark decisions were especially important in this context, 
Dassonville 1974 and Cassis de Dijon 1979. Both concerned the scope of article 28’s 
(ex-article 30) prohibition of  “measures having equivalent effect” to quantitative 
restrictions. During the 1960s, there had been considerable uncertainty about the 
precise meaning of this concept. Did it apply to discriminatory measures only or did it 
also cover non-discriminatory regulations? In Dassonville, the Court established a 
very broad interpretation considering any measure “capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade” as equivalent to a 
quantitative restriction. According to this reading, not only discriminatory measures 
but also non-discriminatory trade restrictions contravened article 28 and had to be 
removed. In Cassis de Dijon the Court spelled out one important implication of this 
broad interpretation: member states cannot deny market access to goods produced 
according to foreign standards unless they can invoke a valid public-policy purpose – 
the so-called rule of reason. In other words, except for those special cases where 
mandatory requirements of safety, health, environmental and consumer protection 
differ across member states, the member states are obliged to mutually recognize their 
regulations as equivalent. “By judicial fiat” the principle of mutual recognition had 
gained constitutional protection (Scharpf 1999:56). The Commission, long 
disenchanted with the “old” harmonization approach to regulatory integration 
(Pelkmans 1987),  quickly seized this opportunity in order to establish mutual   9
recognition as the new standard approach to the removal of technical barriers in the 
Single Market (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994).  
 
The ‘constitutional protection’ of mutual recognition did not extend to taxation, 
however, because taxes fall under the purview of article 90 (ex 95) rather than article 
28 (ex 30). The wording of article 90 (see above) provides a legal basis for subjecting 
national tax policy to very strict tests of national treatment – and this is how the Court 
actually used it (see e.g. Craig and Búrca 2003:593-612). Article 90 provides no basis, 
however, to compel member states to mutually recognize their taxes as equivalent. 
Stating explicitly that taxes on imports should be non-discriminatory, it implicitly 
allows that imports are taxed. This is where it differs most dramatically from article 
28. While individuals, corporations and the Commission can rely on article 28 to 
force governments to accept origin-based regulation, they cannot rely on article 90 to 
force governments to accept origin-based taxation. There is no way, in other words, to 
impose the mutual recognition of taxation by judicial fiat. But, of course, this does not 
rule out imposition by political fiat. The Commission prepared numerous proposals 
for the introduction of an origin-based VAT. However, the Council ignored or 
rejected all of them. Given that the member states already agreed the removal of tax 
adjustments in principle in the late 1960s why don’t they also agree on their removal 
in practise?  
5. Tax  competition 
One possible explanation for the lack of political resolve is fear of a race to the 
bottom in taxation. Mutual recognition exposes states to inter-jurisdictional 
competition. It allows economic operators to arbitrage between national tax and 
regulatory regimes. Because goods lawfully produced and taxed in their country of 
origin can be sold throughout the Community, business firms are free to establish 
origin where taxes and regulations are most attractive. This, in turn, may force 
governments to improve the attractiveness of national taxes and regulations – by 
lowering them. As a consequence, the move to mutual recognition in regulation gave 
rise to dire warnings of excessive competition and deregulation in the 1980s (Gatsios 
and Seabright 1989), and all proposals for an origin-based VAT invariably met with 
warnings of a dangerous race to the bottom in tax rates.  
   10
Are these fears justified? With the benefit of hindsight, it seems fair to say that they 
were unjustified in regulation. Observers agree that there is hardly any evidence of a 
regulatory race to the bottom (Radelli 2004:4). Two factors have prevented this: the 
rule of reason and the high transaction costs of regulatory arbitrage. The rule of 
reason provides a safety net against excessive competitive deregulation. It allows 
member states to refuse market access to imports from countries with regulations that 
are not equivalent to domestic regulations in terms of mandatory requirements of 
safety, health, environmental and consumer protection. Since the member states are 
entitled, by the case law of the Court as well as by the Treaty, to insist on a high level 
of protection there is little competitive advantage to be gained by undercutting other 
member states’ safety standards. To the contrary, tough regulations may be a 
competitive advantage because they are a prerequisite for unrestricted market access. 
Even intense regulatory competition is unlikely, therefore, to undermine essential 
regulatory objectives in the Community (Scharpf 1999:96). Moreover, the high 
transaction costs of regulatory arbitrage largely prevent regulatory competition from 
ever getting intense. For all its theoretical beauty, the principle of mutual recognition 
is often difficult and costly to apply in practise. Even where mandatory requirements 
are equivalent across member states, importers sometimes have trouble to convince 
the member state of destination that their goods meet these requirements in reality. 
National authorities tend to distrust foreign testing bodies of other states and take an 
“overly cautious attitude” when it comes to safety certificates in languages which they 
do not understand (European Commission 1999:8). Of course, importers can take 
recourse to the courts. Often, however, they lack the time and nerve to do so and opt 
for bringing their products into line with the regulations of the member state of 
destination instead. Put bluntly, they waive their right to unrestricted movement 
because the cost of using this right are too high (Pelkmans 2003).  
 
The fears of  tax competition appear better justified by comparison. First, there is no 
safety net against a race to the bottom. Tax revenue is not among the accepted rule of 
reason justifications. The Court has always refused to consider it as a mandatory 
requirement of public policy (Terra and Wattel 2001:81; Lang 2002:376). Also, there 
is no Treaty provision that would entitle member states to deny market access to 
imports from member states with significantly lower taxes. Essential revenue 
objectives do not enjoy the same protection under EU law as essential regulatory   11
objectives. There is no legal safeguard against excessive competitive de-taxation. 
Second, compared to regulatory arbitrage the transaction costs of tax arbitrage are 
likely to be lower, and competitive pressures correspondingly higher. The problem of 
proving equivalence that makes the application of mutual recognition so difficult and 
costly in regulation is absent in taxation. Tax revenue is not a mandatory requirement. 
Hence, governments would have no legal means to deny market access to any import 
lawfully taxed in its member state of origin. Once introduced, mutual recognition 
would apply without derogations. This should greatly reduce the transaction costs of 
its application. Some transaction costs would, of course, remain even then. The size of 
these costs depends on how perfectionist the principle of mutual recognition is 
implemented, i.e. how far it goes in eliminating differences in the tax treatment of 
domestic and cross-border sales. Note, that this is largely a matter of how origin is 
defined for tax purposes. 
 
Originally, the Commission proposed to define origin as place of sale (just see 
Neumark Report 1963:155; Europäische Kommission 1987:???). Under this rule a 
Danish consumer would have to travel to Luxembourg in order to profit from the low 
Luxembourg VAT rate, or buy from a long-distance seller in Luxembourg. This 
clearly involves higher transaction costs than buying in Denmark, and would tend to 
restrict tax arbitrage to a few high priced brand products such as cars, cosmetics, or 
consumer electronics. Also from the perspective of sellers, the Common Market 
would remain fragmented. While at the national level businesses have to register only 
once for VAT purposes, at the European level they would remain obliged to register 
in each member state, in which they effect sales. This involves extra costs such as the 
need to deal with foreign tax authorities and VAT laws, and, thus, is likely to deter 
market entry. In order to avoid these imperfections, the Commission recently 
proposed a different definition of origin: place of residence of the business that effects 
the sale. This definition would bring the right to a “single place of taxation” 
(European Commission 1996:15)to the EU level, i.e. a business or business group 
headquartered in Luxembourg would pay the entire VAT for all its European-wide 
sales in Luxembourg and under Luxembourg VAT laws. This would not only make 
life easier for the Luxembourg business group but also greatly reduce the arbitrage 
costs for the Danish consumer. He would no longer have to travel to Luxembourg to 
take advantage of Luxembourg’s low VAT. He could simply go to a Danish shop   12
owned by a Luxembourg company and achieve the same result. Danish companies 
would be forced to arrange for take-overs from Luxembourg or other low VAT 
member states in order to defend market share. The Danish government would be 
hard pressed to defend the high level of Danish VAT.  
6. Tax  diversity 
Given the threat of tax competition, it is not surprising that many member states insist 
on a close approximation of tax levels as a precondition for a switch to an origin-
based VAT. The Commission has, over the years, presented numerous proposals to 
this effect, and, the unanimity requirement notwithstanding, the Council adopted 
some of them. Most importantly, it harmonized the VAT base in 1977 (Europäische 
Gemeinschaft 1977), and restricted the range of VAT rates to a single standard rate of 
at least 15 percent and a maximum of two reduced rates of at least five percent in 
1992(Europäische Gemeinschaft 1992). Despite these measures, large cross-national 
differences remain (see table 1). Standard VAT rates vary between 15 percent in 
Luxembourg and Cyprus and 25 percent in Denmark, Sweden and Hungary. VAT 
revenues as a percentage of GDP (VAT ratios) range from a low of 6,1 percent in 
Spain to a high of 9,7 percent in Denmark.
2 Given these differences, agreement on 
closely aligned or even identical rates is likely to be costly for at least some member 
states. Calculations by Bernd Genser suggest, for example, that a switch to a uniform 
EU standard VAT rate of 19 percent – close to the current average rate of 19,4 percent 
– would cause a revenue loss of 2.4 percent of GDP or 4.7 percent of total tax revenue 
in Denmark and a revenue gain of 1,5 percent of GDP or 3,7 percent of total tax 
revenue in Luxembourg. Nine other EU-15 states would be forced to accommodate 
revenue changes of more than 0,5 percent of GDP or 1,4 percent of total tax revenue 
(Genser 2003:742). These adjustment costs work as a disincentive to VAT 
harmonization.  
 
                                                 
2 The standard VAT rate and the VAT ratio are, of course, imperfect indicators of the effective VAT 
burden. The standard rate applies to different shares of the total VAT tax base in different member 
states. Identical standard rates do not necessarily indicate identical effective tax burdens, therefore. The 
VAT ratio depends not only on the VAT rate and tax base definitions but also on other factors, such as 
the size of the underlying macroeconomic tax base. If the share of consumption in total GDP goes up, 
the VAT ratio will rise as well, even if rates and base definitions remain unchanged. More fine-grained 
indicators such as the “Implicit VAT Rate” control for these factors but are not available in time series 
format. Also, data for the year 2000 suggests that the implicit VAT rate is highly correlated with the 
standard VAT rate (r=0,92) and the VAT ratio (r=0,83). It is not unreasonable, therefore, to take these 
two measures as proxies of the effective VAT burden.    13
Table 1: VAT rates and ratios in the EU 
  EU-15 EU-25 
VAT rates 2004     
Max.  25 (DK, SE)  25 (DK, SE, HU) 
Min.  15 (LU)  15 (LU, CY) 
Mean 19,6  19,4 
SD 2,9  2,75 
SD/ Mean  0,15  0,14 
VAT ratios 2002    
Max.  9,7 (DK)  9,7 (DK) 
Min.  6,1 (ES)  6,1 (ES) 
Mean 7,5  7,7 
SD 1,0  1,0 
SD/ Mean  0,14  0,13 
Source: European Commission 2004 (rates), Eurostat 2004 (ratios) 




Note, however, that disincentives can be thwarted by more powerful incentives. 
Economists in the public choice tradition suggest that tax collusion may offer such an 
incentive. It is seen as a powerful driver of fiscal centralization in federal states: Sub-
national governments coordinate their tax policies at the national level in order to 
collectively protect their revenues from competitive and electoral pressures, and it is 
surmised that the same incentive could also facilitate tax harmonization in the EU 
(e.g. Brennan and Buchanan 1988:9.4; Vaubel 1992). Pressed by tax competition in 
direct taxation, faced with domestic opposition to increases in indirect taxation, and 
settled with high spending requirements in social policy, some governments may 
indeed regard agreement on a high uniform VAT rate as an attractive escape route 
from the fiscal conundrum that is well worth considerable domestic adjustment costs. 
Note that this is not without precedent. Take the switch to the common European 
VAT system in 1967 as an example. It forced five member states to fundamentally 
reform their turnover taxes in order to adopt the tax system of the sixth member state, 
France. The five agreed nevertheless, because the French VAT had a clear advantage 
– it caused less economic distortion than cascade taxes and, therefore, allowed to raise   14
more revenue. Harmonization made it easier for governments to gain this advantage. 
Deciding collectively on the introduction of VAT in Brussels helped each of them 
individually to overcome political opposition to VAT at home (Genschel 2002:70-75). 
Tax harmonization allows for tax collusion, and this, in turn, facilitates the 
accommodation of tax diversity.  
 
Note also that tax diversity is constantly decreasing in the EU. As figure 1 shows 
VAT rates and ratios were much more dissimilar in the 1970s Community of nine 
than in the early 2000s Community of fifteen. While the trend towards VAT 
convergence slowed down considerably during the past decade, it was not even 
stopped by the most recent round of enlargement. Table 1 suggests that the addition of 
ten new member states has not fundamentally changed the distribution of VAT rates 
and ratios in the EU, and may even have slightly increased the concentration around 
the mean. The problems associated with tax diversity are unlikely to disappear any 
time soon. However, if recent trends continue, they will become smaller in the future.  
 

















Source: European Commission 2004 (rates), OECD Revenue Statistics 2005 (ratio) 
Note: EU member states refers to the EU-9 for the period 1973-1986, the EU-12 for 1987-1994, and the 
EU-15 for 1995-2003. 
 
7. Tax  administration 
-  to be written –    15
 
8. Conclusions? 
-  to be written – 
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